Registration without Representation: Treatment of Foreign Sex Offense Convictions under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act by Morris, Tom
Liberty University Law Review
Volume 12 | Issue 1 Article 4
January 2018
Registration without Representation: Treatment of
Foreign Sex Offense Convictions under the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act
Tom Morris
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberty University School of Law at DigitalCommons@Liberty University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Liberty University Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@Liberty University. For more information,
please contact scholarlycommunication@liberty.edu.
Recommended Citation
Morris, Tom (2018) "Registration without Representation: Treatment of Foreign Sex Offense Convictions under the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act," Liberty University Law Review: Vol. 12 : Iss. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review/vol12/iss1/4
NOTE 
REGISTRATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION: 
TREATMENT OF FOREIGN SEX OFFENSE CONVICTIONS 
UNDER THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND 
NOTIFICATION ACT 
Tom Morris† 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................... 72 
I.  INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 73 
II.   BACKGROUND ................................................................................................ 75 
A.  SORNA ................................................................................................ 75 
B.  Federal Rule of Evidence 609 .............................................................. 78 
III.  THE LACK OF DUE PROCESS FOR SEX OFFENDERS: A CALL TO 
REEVALUATE .................................................................................................. 80 
A.  The SORNA Final Guidelines Due Process Requirements ............... 80 
1.  Class 1 Jurisdictions .................................................................... 80 
2.  Class 2 Jurisdictions .................................................................... 82 
3. Class 3 Jurisdictions .................................................................... 84 
B.  Registration Without Representation ............................................... 85 
1. Registration for Domestic Sex Offense Convictions .............. 85 
2.  Registration for Foreign Convictions ....................................... 87 
3.  McCarty v. Roos ........................................................................... 89 
a. Unconstitutional Vagueness .............................................. 90 
b. Procedural due process ...................................................... 91 
C. Foreign Convictions and Federal Rule of Evidence 609 .................... 94 
IV.  LOOKING TO THE UCCJEA AS A WAY FORWARD ..................................... 97 
A.  In Re Marriage of Donboli ................................................................ 97 
                                                                                                                                      
 † Student Development Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 12. J.D. 
Candidate, Liberty University School of Law (2018). Words cannot express the depth of 
gratitude and appreciation I have towards my loving wife and children for their endless 
support and encouragement as I undertook the burden of Law Review and Law School in 
general. Without them, none of this would have been possible. Many thanks to my parents 
and family who have all been endlessly supportive of my pursuit of a law degree. Finally, I 
would be remiss to not recognize the contributions of Professor Barbara Mouly, who gave 
me the inspiration for this topic, and Professor Caren Harp, who patiently took the time to 
discuss SORNA specifically, and the positive and negative impacts of sex offender registry 
laws generally. 
72 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:71 
 
B.  Applying Donboli to SORNA ............................................................. 99 
V.  CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 103 
ABSTRACT 
There are few things more stigmatizing or damaging to an individual’s 
reputation and ability to carry on day-to-day activities than being branded 
and forced to register as a sex offender. Studies have shown that the 
registration of sex offenders may actually cause more harm than good. In 
light of these dual harms, one would hope that any legislation which 
imposes additional registration requirements would be narrowly tailored to 
effect a specific legislative goal. Unfortunately, the Adam Walsh Act and the 
Sex Offender Registry and Notification Act (“SORNA”) contained therein 
have proven to be anything but narrowly tailored.  
SORNA provided the minimum reporting requirements that states must 
apply to maintain their funding. As part of those reporting requirements, 
convicted of sex offenses in foreign jurisdictions must also register upon 
their return to the United States. 
Along with the reporting requirements, SORNA also established the 
Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, 
and Tracking, or the SMART Office. SMART is responsible for proffering 
the Final Guidelines—the regulatory scheme through which SORNA is 
implemented. This Note will discuss the near total lack of due process 
afforded to those convicted of sex offenses in foreign jurisdictions as a result 
of the Final Guidelines. 
Under the Final Guidelines, foreign jurisdictions are divided into three 
categories. The first category is comprised of four countries that share the 
English Common Law tradition with the United States: Great Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. The second category includes those 
countries that the United States Department of State has determined 
generally enforced principles of fairness and due process within the year of 
the conviction. The third category contains all other jurisdictions.  
The issue with SORNA arises in its prohibition of judicial review in the 
United States to determine if an individual with a foreign sex offense 
conviction was actually granted due process and fundamental fairness in his 
conviction. The Final Guidelines effectively create a per se rule that foreign 
convictions were attained properly and, therefore, registration is required. 
This prohibition against judicial oversight, coupled with a complete 
abrogation of any duty to protect the due process rights of United States 
citizens, results in a fundamentally unfair, unconstitutional legal framework 
that is capable of permanently stigmatizing individuals who have 
committed no wrong.  
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This Note will explore the deficiencies of SORNA and its Final 
Guidelines, and demonstrate just one of the real world consequences caused 
by those deficiencies, as seen through Federal Rule of Evidence 609. In 
addition, this Note will propose an easily adapted solution to the problems 
with SORNA, and advocate for an approach already utilized by American 
courts under the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are rarely, if ever, large public outcries to increase the protections 
of fundamental fairness and due process afforded to sex offenders. The 
public disdain for sex offenders is so great that there is even an entire “tv 
trope” dedicated to the terrible treatment they receive in prison,1 a trope 
that is based in reality:2  
In prison, there is no creature lower than a sex offender. Even 
snitches get a pass before these guys. SOs, chomos, pedophiles—
the nicknames all mean the same thing, and they help average 
convicts differentiate themselves from those they like to believe 
are the real monsters.  
. . . . [I]nmates in the California state prison system are getting 
killed at twice the national average, with sex offenders 
disproportionately likely to meet their demise inside—which is 
awful, but not too surprising given how much hatred is directed 
at those inmates.3 
The level of open abhorrence towards these offenders is somewhat 
understandable, and can even prove cathartic. After all, these offenders 
were convicted of taking advantage of innocents in their most vulnerable 
state. However, the U.S. Constitution does not, and should not, vary its 
guarantees of protection and fairness towards prisoners based on the 
despicability of a crime. Even Dzhokhar Tsaernev, the perpetrator of the 
2013 Boston Marathon bombing,4 was as protected by the due process 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. Pariah Prisoner, TVTROPES, 
http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/PariahPrisoner (last visited Aug. 29, 2017). 
 2. Seth Ferranti, Why Are So Many Sex Offenders Getting Murdered in California’s 
Prisons?, VICE (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.vice.com/read/why-sex-offenders-are-getting-
slaughtered-in-california-prisons-218. 
 3. Id. 
 4. United States v. Tsarnaev, 2015 WL 3945832 (D. Mass.) (Trial Order). 
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guarantees of the Constitution, just as someone who commits petit larceny 
would be protected.  
Unfortunately, this equality of protection appears to have been 
unimportant to Congress when the Adam Walsh Act was passed in 2006.5 
The Adam Walsh Act includes the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act, or SORNA.6 Among other things, SORNA requires the 
registration of sex offenders convicted of sex offenses in foreign 
jurisdictions, without requiring even minimum standards of due process to 
validate the foreign convictions.7 Furthermore, there is no provision in the 
Act that allows an individual convicted of a sex offense in a foreign 
jurisdiction to protest the registration requirement prior to being 
registered.8  
This Note will explore this complete lack of protections for the subset of 
sex offenders required to register under SORNA due to their conviction in a 
foreign jurisdiction. Part III of the Note will give a detailed examination of 
the lack of due process protections, as well as the unavailability of judicial 
relief for those offenders. Part IV will examine just one of the many 
potential negative effects of SORNA, and the effect that registration without 
a guarantee of due process can have on third parties under Federal Rule of 
Evidence (“FRE”) 609. Finally, Part V will provide a potential judicially 
implemented solution by comparing the requirements of SORNA to the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”).9 
                                                                                                                                      
 5. Adam Walsh Act, 34 U.S.C. § 20901 (2006).  
 6. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911, 20961-62 
(2006). 
 7. This will be discussed and documented thoroughly in Part III. A citation to a 
specific section of SORNA is unhelpful, because an analysis of the law as a whole must be 
undertaken.   
 8. This will be discussed and documented thoroughly in Part III. A citation to a 
specific section of SORNA is unhelpful, because an analysis of the law as a whole must be 
undertaken.   
 9. UNI. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENF’T ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS 
ON UNI. STATE LS. 1997). The UCCJEA has been approved in 49 states and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands. The only state to not yet implement the UCCJEA is Massachusetts; however, it was 
introduced in 2016 as HB36/SB2392. Puerto Rico has not adopted the UCCJEA. Child 
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, UNI. L. COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2017). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  SORNA 
Title I of the Adam Walsh Act of 200610 is the Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act, commonly referred to as SORNA.11 The Adam Walsh 
Act was passed with the purpose of replacing the Jacob Wetterling12 sex 
offender registration requirements, which had been enacted during the 
1990s.13 The Wetterling Act established a baseline for sex offender 
registration requirements, including the public notification provision, 
“Megan’s Law.”14 By the late 1990s, every state was in compliance with the 
Wetterling Act.15 
SORNA was enacted “[i]n response to a number of high-profile cases,” in 
which despicable crimes were committed by individuals with prior sex 
crime convictions, who had, nevertheless, not been forced to register under 
the Wetterling Act.16 This motivation is revealed in SORNA’s stated 
purpose, which is “to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders 
against children, and in response to the vicious attacks by violent predators 
against the victims listed below . . . establish[] a comprehensive national 
system for the registration of those offenders.”17 Following the stated 
purpose is a list of the seventeen victims for whom SORNA was enacted, 
along with a short description of what happened to them.18 This inclusion 
of the victims and their stories reveals the inherently politicized nature of 
SORNA and the Adam Walsh Act as a whole, as evidenced by the fact that 
                                                                                                                                      
 10. The act was named the Adam Walsh Act in memory of Adam Walsh, son of John 
and Revé Walsh, who was abducted and slain on July 27, 1981 in Hollywood Florida. After 
Adam’s tragic death, his parents “dedicated themselves to protecting children from child 
predators, preventing attacks on our children, and bringing child predators to justice.” Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 2, 120 Stat 587, 590 
(2006). 
 11. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911, 20961-62 
(2006).  
 12. Wetterling Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071-73 (repealed 2006). 
 13. Lori McPherson, Practitioner’s Guide to the Adam Walsh Act, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE (2007). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. 
 17. 34 U.S.C. § 20901 (2006).  
 18. Id. 
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“[d]ozens of states have declined to comply with this federal mandate, citing 
both federalism and cost concerns.”19 
The inherently political nature of the Adam Walsh Act has caused a 
variety of problems, some of which will be will be discussed later in this 
Note. The particularly heinous nature of sex crimes, and the perceived 
political value in a politician being deemed “tough on crime,” creates 
incentives for politicians of all political persuasions to pass laws strongly 
condemning these crimes.20 Sex offenders are easy targets for these laws for 
the simple reason that relatively few people are overly (or, for that matter, 
even slightly) concerned with protecting the rights of sex offenders.21 
Nonetheless, SORNA is not immune from criticism for its lack of 
protections for the constitutional rights of sex offenders.22 
The primary treatment of foreign sex offense convictions is found in the 
definition section of SORNA. “A foreign conviction is not a sex offense for 
the purposes of this subchapter if it was not obtained with sufficient 
safeguards for fundamental fairness and due process for the accused under 
guidelines or regulations established under section 20912 of this title.”23 A 
careful reading of this section compels an immediate question: what 
constitutes “sufficient safeguards for fundamental fairness and due 
process?”24 The section directs the reader to section 20912, which states, in 
relevant part, “[t]he Attorney General shall issue guidelines and regulations 
to interpret and implement this subchapter.”25 Unfortunately, this only 
raises more questions, some of which will be discussed in a later section of 
this Note.  
The government agency responsible for implementing SORNA is the 
Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, 
                                                                                                                                      
 19. Scarlet Letters and Federal Mandates: Reconsidering Juvenile Sex Offender 
Registration and the Adam Walsh Act, THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y, http://www.fed-
soc.org/multimedia/detail/scarlet-letters-and-federal-mandates-reconsidering-juvenile-sex-
offender-registration-and-the-adam-walsh-act (last visited Oct. 16, 2016). 
 20. As an example, the Adam Walsh Act was passed by a voice vote, indicating strong 
bipartisan support for the bill. H.R. 4472 (109th): Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety 
Act of 2006, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hr4472 (last visited Oct. 
16, 2006).  
 21. Julia T. Rickert, Comment, Denying Defendants the Benefit of a Reasonable Doubt: 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 and Past Sex Crime Convictions, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
213, 217 (2010). 
 22. See McCarty v. Roos, 998 F. Supp. 2d 950 (D. Nev. 2014).  
 23. 34 U.S.C. § 20911 (2006). 
 24. Id. 
 25. 34 U.S.C. § 20912 (2006). 
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and Tracking, or the SMART office.26 The SMART office promulgates the 
Final Guidelines, which provide the rules for the implementation of 
SORNA.27 These guidelines are comprehensive, controlling everything from 
the “covered jurisdictions”28 to the “enforcement of registration 
requirements.”29 Section IV, Subsection B of the Final Guidelines addresses 
how foreign convictions are treated:30 “Section 111(5)(B) of SORNA 
instructs that registration need not be required on the basis of a foreign 
conviction if the conviction ‘was not obtained with sufficient safeguards for 
fundamental fairness and due process for the accused under guidelines or 
regulations established [by the Attorney General].’”31 
The Guidelines establish three categories of countries with regard to their 
safeguards for fundamental fairness and due process.32 The first category—
encompassing Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand—
is deemed to have “sufficient safeguards for fundamental fairness and due 
process” as a matter of law.33 As such, any sex conviction obtained under 
the laws of those countries requires the convicted person to register under 
SORNA.34 The second category includes “convictions under the laws of any 
foreign country . . . if the U.S. State Department, in its Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices, has concluded that an independent judiciary 
generally (or vigorously) enforced the right to a fair trial in that country 
during the year in which the conviction occurred.”35 Such convictions also 
require the offender to register under SORNA.36  
                                                                                                                                      
 26. Id. at § 20945.  
 27. The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 
38,030 (July 2, 2008) [hereinafter Final Guidelines]. For ease of reference, all citations to the 
Final Guidelines will be made in reference to the PDF version of the guidelines available on 
the SMART website at https://ojp.gov/smart/pdfs/final_sornaguidelines.pdf. 
 28. Final Guidelines, supra note 27, § III.  
 29. Id. at § XIII. 
 30. Id. at § IV (B). 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Final Guidelines, supra note 27, § IV (B). While neither the text of SORNA nor the 
Final Guidelines offers an explanation for the blanket acceptance of convictions from these 
countries, it is most likely due to the strong Common Law tradition they share with the 
United States. This will be further explained in Part III.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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The third and final category carries the most potential for abuse. The 
third category encompasses convictions that do not fit into Category One or 
Two.37 For Category Three convictions,  
a jurisdiction is not required to register the convicted person if 
the jurisdiction determines—through whatever process or 
procedure it may choose to adopt—that the conviction does not 
constitute a reliable indication of factual guilt because of the lack 
of an impartial tribunal, because of denial of the right to respond 
to the evidence against the person or to present exculpatory 
evidence, or because of denial of the right to the assistance of 
counsel.38  
This catch-all provision allows a jurisdiction to exercise its discretion 
whether to require registration for certain foreign sex offense convictions. 
Such discretion opens the door for disparate treatment of offenders 
depending on locale. As if the third category of convictions were not 
troubling enough, the Final Guidelines’ section on Foreign Convictions 
ends by allowing jurisdictions total discretion to choose to ignore these 
categories completely.39  
B.  Federal Rule of Evidence 609 
Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 609 allows for the impeachment of a 
witness through the introduction of evidence of a past criminal 
conviction.40 For a past criminal conviction to be admissible, the conviction 
must have been for a crime that was punishable by death or imprisonment 
for more than one year in the convicting jurisdiction; it must be admitted in 
accordance with FRE 403; and, in a criminal case, the witness must not be a 
defendant.41 However, if the witness is a defendant, the evidence must be 
admitted “if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
                                                                                                                                      
 37. Id. 
 38. Final Guidelines, supra note 27, § IV (B) (emphasis added). 
 39. Id.  
The foregoing standards do not mean that jurisdictions must incorporate these 
particular criteria or procedures into their registration systems. Jurisdictions 
may wish to register all foreign sex offense convicts, or to register such convicts 
with fewer qualifications or limitations than those allowed [in the three 
categories] . . . . [J]urisdictions are free to require registration more broadly 
than the SORNA minimum.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 40. Fed. R. Evid. 609. 
 41. Fed. R. Evid. § (a)(1)(A). 
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effect to that defendant.”42 Additionally, “the evidence must be admitted if 
the court can readily determine that establishing the elements of the crime 
required proving—or the witness’s admitting—a dishonest act or false 
statement.”43  
A further limit exists on the admissibility of previous convictions “if 
more than 10 years have passed since the witness’s conviction or release 
from confinement for it, whichever is later.”44 If more than ten years have 
passed from either the date of conviction or the release from confinement, 
then the conviction is admissible only if its probative value substantially 
outweighs any prejudicial effect; and the person offering the conviction as 
evidence give the other party reasonable written notice that the conviction 
will be offered as evidence.45 These limitations to the use of prior 
convictions for impeachment purposes can be summed up into three major 
exceptions: 
First, a court may not allow such prior conviction evidence if the 
prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value. 
Second, only convictions within the last ten years may be used to 
impeach the defendant’s credibility. Third, only felony 
convictions or [those] misdemeanor convictions which involved 
dishonesty or false statements may be used.46 
Although not explicitly mentioned, FRE 609 also regulates the 
admissibility of foreign convictions.47 This absence of an explicit mention of 
the treatment of foreign convictions may be due to the relatively recent 
development of state law explicitly concerned with foreign convictions.48 
However, due to the increasingly global society we live in, more Americans 
have the opportunity to be convicted of foreign sex crimes, and there is an 
                                                                                                                                      
 42. Fed. R. Evid. § (a)(1)(B). 
 43. Fed. R. Evid. § (a)(2). 
 44. Fed. R. Evid. § (b). 
 45. Fed. R. Evid. 609 § (b)(1)-(2). 
 46. Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong With Federal Rule Of Evidence 609: A Look at 
How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 2 (1999). 
 47. Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 568 
(2014). 
 48. Martha Kimes, Note, The Effect of Foreign Criminal Convictions under American 
Repeat Offender Statutes: A Case Against the Use of Foreign Crimes in Determining Habitual 
Criminal Status, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 503, 505 (1997); see also A. Kenneth Pye, The 
Effect of Foreign Criminal Judgments in the United States, 32 UMKC L. REV. 114, 116 (1964). 
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increase in the number of visitors coming to the United States who may 
have sex offense convictions from other countries.49 
It is difficult to determine exactly how many witnesses have been 
impeached through the admission of evidence of foreign sex convictions. 
However, given the increase in the rate of “sex tourism,” particularly child 
sex tourism, it is inevitable that there will be an increase in foreign sex 
convictions, which logically would lead to an increase in the availability of 
FRE 609 as a method of impeachment.50 
III. THE LACK OF DUE PROCESS FOR SEX OFFENDERS: A CALL TO 
REEVALUATE 
A.  The SORNA Final Guidelines Due Process Requirements 
1.  Class 1 Jurisdictions51 
Convictions within a Class 1 jurisdiction are per se registrable under the 
Final Guidelines. In other words, they were “obtained with sufficient 
safeguards for fundamental fairness and due process for the accused.”52 
There are four countries which fall into Class 1: Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.53 Notably, the Final Guidelines go 
beyond stating that Class 1 jurisdictions satisfy the fundamental fairness 
and due process requirements to specify that “registration must be required 
for such convictions on the same footing as domestic convictions.”54 This 
requirement means that even if a state were to undertake an inquiry into the 
fairness of a conviction from Canada, and determine that there was a lack of 
fundamental fairness, the state is barred from protecting its citizen from an 
unjust registration requirement.  
Admittedly, the likelihood of an unjust conviction under the laws of 
Canada, or the other three Class 1 jurisdictions, does not appear to be great. 
The four nations which comprise Class 1 jurisdictions all enjoy the same 
                                                                                                                                      
 49. Kimes, supra note 48, at 505.  
 50. Extraterritorial Sexual Exploitation of Children, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE CHILD 
EXPLOITATION AND OBSCENITY SECTION, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
ceos/extraterritorial-sexual-exploitation-children (Jan. 25, 2016). 
 51. While SORNA does not explicitly refer to the various jurisdictions as Class 1, 2, or 3, 
it does implicitly recognize three distinct categories of foreign jurisdictions. The Class 1, 2, 
and 3 Jurisdiction nomenclature is of my own design, and is intended for ease of 
understanding. It will be used throughout this Note.  
 52. Final Guidelines, supra note 27, § IV(B).  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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common-law tradition as the United States, derived from English common 
law.55 As such, certain fundamental concepts such as the rule of law and due 
process are cornerstones of the legal systems of the four nations. However, 
the presence of a common-law tradition, with its inherent protections, is 
what makes the extra stipulation in the Final Guidelines so peculiar and 
disturbing. Assuming there is merely a miniscule risk of an individual 
having their due process rights violated by a Class 1 jurisdiction, what harm 
could possibly arise by allowing a state to allow judicial inquiry into 
whether such a violation occurred?56  
An individual convicted of a sex offense within the United States is 
entitled to challenge his or her conviction and have it overturned, if there 
was not sufficient safeguards for fundamental fairness and due process.57 
Yet, the current enforcement measures of SORNA do not afford a U.S. 
                                                                                                                                      
 55. This English common law tradition of the four Class 1 jurisdictions as well as the 
United States is unsurprising, as all were established as British colonies. While the United 
States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have all severed ties to the United Kingdom to 
varying degrees, they have all maintained their respective judicial systems which were built 
upon the English common law.  
 56. Undoubtedly this question would be answered by both courts and the SMART office 
by stating the need for judicial economy, and the undesirability of retrying a case which was 
tried in a judicial system presumably very similar to ours. Admittedly, the likelihood of 
serious violations of due process and fundamental fairness are rare from Class 1 
jurisdictions. In light of that, a solution which should satisfy those concerned for judicial 
economy is already in place. A motion to dismiss after the complaint is filed would provide 
ample opportunity for the registering jurisdiction and the court to dispose of false claims of 
due process violations. In all likelihood, the majority of filings would be dismissed, thus 
preserving the court’s time, as well as providing a method for judicial relief for any 
unfortunate individual who may be convicted without due process in a Class 1 jurisdiction.   
 57. All U.S. citizens are entitled to sue their respective states for violations of the due 
process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that 
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in 
such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the 
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the 
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of 
Columbia. 
Id. Additionally, federally convicted prisoners may petition to have their sentence 
overturned for a number of reasons, such as ineffective assistance of counsel or gross 
misapplications of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). 
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citizen who is convicted in a Class 1 jurisdiction that same right, leading to 
the bizarre implication that the U.S. government has more faith in the 
ability the judicial systems of other countries to provide sufficient 
safeguards for due process and fundamental fairness than it does in the U.S. 
judicial system. In reality, the more likely reason for this flaw in the law is 
the U.S. government’s lack of care for the rights of convicted sex offenders. 
2.  Class 2 Jurisdictions 
Similar to Class 1 jurisdictions, convictions from a Class 2 jurisdiction 
require registration. However, unlike the four Class 1 jurisdictions, Class 2 
jurisdictions are defined by the U.S. State Department. They also are not 
necessarily common law nations.  
Sex offense convictions under the laws of any foreign country are 
deemed to have been obtained with sufficient safeguards for 
fundamental fairness and due process if the U.S. State 
Department, in its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 
has concluded that an independent judiciary generally (or 
vigorously) enforced the right to a fair trial in that country 
during the year in which the conviction occurred.58 
There are several particularly troubling implications from the definition 
of a Class 2 jurisdiction. First, the State Department must only have 
determined that a nation’s independent judiciary “generally (or vigorously) 
enforced the right to a fair trial.”59 The fact that a nation generally enforces 
the right to a fair trial is surely of little comfort to a defendant who is denied 
due process or a fundamental fairness in his particular trial. Yet, despite the 
lack of a determination that each particular trial was actually fair, a 
conviction from a Class 2 jurisdiction requires registration on par with a 
Class 1 jurisdiction.  
Another issue with the treatment of a conviction from a Class 2 
jurisdiction is that such a conviction is given parity equal to a domestic 
conviction, as well as a conviction from a Class 1 jurisdiction.60 While a 
Class 1 jurisdiction is at least a common-law nation with a legal tradition 
similar to that of the United States, a Class 2 jurisdiction could follow any 
                                                                                                                                      
 58. Final Guidelines, supra note 27, § IV(B). 
 59. Id. (emphasis added). 
 60. See supra Part III.A.1.  
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schema of law. One such country that would require automatic registration 
as a Class 2 jurisdiction is Colombia.61 
 According to the Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015, 
Colombia generally respected judicial independence and provided for a fair 
public trial, making it a Class 2 jurisdiction.62 The report noted that 
defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty, that they have the 
right to present their own evidence, and have an attorney present.63 
However, Colombia’s criminal system does not give defendants a right to a 
jury.64 Granted, the lack of a jury is arguably insufficient to undermine the 
fairness or due process of a trial. Yet, what makes the report particularly 
troubling is that in it, the State Department noted that “[m]uch of the 
judicial system was overburdened and inefficient, and subornation and 
intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and witnesses hindered judicial 
functioning.”65 This rather shocking finding means that the State 
Department considers a country where the judges are subject to 
“subornation and intimidation,” and who are “overburdened and 
inefficient” to be a country that generally enforces the right to a fair trial.66 
This is an especially questionable assessment since Colombia has no juries 
to counterbalance the ineffectiveness of these judges.67  
Hypothetically, an individual could be falsely accused of a sex offense in 
Colombia, prosecuted by a bribed prosecutor, and declared guilty of the sex 
offense by a judge who has been intimidated. Upon entering the United 
States that individual would have to register as a sex offender, even if he 
could provide the registering jurisdiction with concrete, absolute proof of 
the corrupt nature of the judicial proceeding. The U.S. court would be 
bound because the Final Guidelines do not allow a state to investigate the 
fairness of a conviction from a Class 2 jurisdiction.68 Such a conviction is 
placed on the same footing as a domestic conviction. This constitutes an 
                                                                                                                                      
 61. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 2015 for Colombia, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2015/wha/253001.htm.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 2015 for Colombia, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2015/wha/253001.htm. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Final Guidelines, supra note 27, § IV(B). 
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absolute abrogation of any duty a state has to protect the due process rights 
of its citizens. 
3. Class 3 Jurisdictions 
Any jurisdiction which does not fall into either Class 1 or 2 is by default a 
Class 3 jurisdiction. When confronted with a conviction from a Class 3 
jurisdiction, the local state registry is 
not required to register the convicted person if the jurisdiction 
determines—through whatever process or procedure it may 
choose to adopt—that the conviction does not constitute a 
reliable indication of factual guilt because of the lack of an 
impartial tribunal, because of denial of the right to respond to 
the evidence against the person or to present exculpatory 
evidence, or because of denial of the right to the assistance of 
counsel.69  
A state is at least allowed to make an inquiry into the procedure of a 
conviction from a Class 3 jurisdiction, but there remain several insufficient 
aspects of the treatment of Class 3 convictions. First, there is no actual 
protection afforded to defendants convicted in Class 3 jurisdictions, despite 
language that purportedly offers some protections. The language, “a 
jurisdiction is not required to register,”70 does not mean that a state cannot 
register a convicted sex offender if there was no due process. Instead, it 
simply allows a state to choose whether to register the offender. Nowhere is 
there a prohibition on registering a convicted offender, even if the state 
undertakes a thorough investigation and determines the individual was 
railroaded by a kangaroo court in a sham trial.71  
Furthermore, a state may elect a rigorous investigation into the fairness 
of a trial, a precursory investigation, or presumably no investigation at all.72 
A country is considered a Class 3 jurisdiction if it does not follow the 
common-law tradition shared by the Class 1 jurisdictions. Additionally, the 
country does not qualify as a Class 2 jurisdiction, meaning the US 
Department of State has looked at the country and determined that within 
                                                                                                                                      
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. (emphasis added). 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id (stating that a state may utilize “whatever process or procedure it may choose to 
adopt”). 
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the last year, it has not even generally upheld and guaranteed due process 
and fundamental fairness principles in its tribunals.73  
The United States Constitution grants specific protections for due 
process rights,74 such as the right to a fair trial,75 the right for the accused to 
confront his accuser,76  and the right for the accused to be judged by a jury 
of her peers.77 There is no adequate reason offered by either SORNA or the 
Final Guidelines to allow states such leeway in choosing whether to protect 
the rights guaranteed to U.S. citizens, even those convicted of heinous 
crimes.  
B.  Registration Without Representation 
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the predicament in 
which those convicted of sex offenses in foreign jurisdictions find 
themselves, the process through which registration occurs must be 
evaluated. First, the process for those convicted in the United States of sex 
crimes requiring registration will be discussed. Then, that process will be 
contrasted with the one required for those convicted in foreign 
jurisdictions. 
1. Registration for Domestic Sex Offense Convictions 
The procedure for initial registration for domestic sex offenders is laid 
out in Section IX of the Final Guidelines.78 For an incarcerated sex offender, 
the jurisdiction must require registration prior to release from 
incarceration.79 Traditionally, the sentencing court will forward the 
required information to the registration office,80 making the registration 
process automatic with no effort from the offender. For an offender who 
was given a non-imprisonment sentence, the offender must register within 
three business days of sentencing.81 This is also often done automatically.82 
                                                                                                                                      
 73. Final Guidelines, supra note 27, § IV(B); see also, supra Part III.A.2. 
 74. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V, XIV. 
 75. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 76. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 77. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 78. Final Guidelines, supra note 27, § IX. The Guidelines refer to §§ 113(b) and 117(a) of 
SORNA as the legislative authority for determining initial registration.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Interview with Caren Harp, Associate Professor, Liberty University School of Law, 
in Lynchburg, VA (Oct. 27, 2016). 
 81. Final Guidelines, supra note 27, § IX. 
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The Final Guidelines provide a helpful three-step registration procedure, 
which envisions the registering agency doing the following:  
• Informing the sex offender of his or her duties under 
SORNA and explaining those duties[;] . . . 
• Requiring the sex offender to read and sign a form stating 
that the duty to register has been explained and that the sex 
offender understands the registration requirement[; and 
finally] 
• Ensuring that the sex offender is registered—i.e., obtaining 
the required registration information for the sex offender 
and submitting that information for inclusion in the 
registry.83 
Once the initial registration information is entered into the registry, the 
“initial registration jurisdiction must immediately forward the registration 
information to all other jurisdictions in which the sex offender is required 
to register.”84 The required information that must be made publicly 
available includes the following: 
• The name of the sex offender, including any aliases; 
• The address of each residence at which the sex offender 
resides or will reside . . . ; 
• The address of any place where the sex offender is an 
employee or will be an employee . . . ; 
• The address of any place where the sex offender is . . . or will 
be a student; 
• The license plate number and a description of any vehicle 
owned or operated by the sex offender; 
• A physical description of the sex offender; 
• The sex offense for which the sex offender is registered and 
any other sex offense for which the sex offender has been 
convicted; 
• A current photograph of the sex offender.85 
The offender must “register and keep the registration current in each 
jurisdiction in which the sex offender resides, is an employee, or is a 
                                                                                                                                      
 82. Interview with Caren Harp, Associate Professor, Liberty University School of Law, 
in Lynchburg, VA (Oct. 27, 2016). 
 83. Final Guidelines, supra note 27, § IX.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Final Guidelines, supra note 27, § VII (“Discretionary Exemptions and Required 
Inclusions”). 
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student.”86 Additionally, for the initial registration, the “offender must also 
register in the jurisdiction in which convicted if it is different from the 
jurisdiction of residence.”87 
2.  Registration for Foreign Convictions 
Under § 128 of SORNA, “the Attorney General, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security, [must] establish 
a system for informing the relevant jurisdictions about persons entering the 
United States who are required to register under SORNA.”88 As the 
Guidelines point out, because the foreign offender is convicted and 
imprisoned in a foreign country, there would be no domestic jurisdiction in 
place to register the offender prior to his release from incarceration.89 Thus, 
the Guidelines set the following procedure for foreign convicted offenders 
to follow for registration: 
A jurisdiction must require a person with a foreign conviction 
for which registration is required under SORNA to appear in 
person to register within three business days of entering the 
jurisdiction to reside or commencing employment or school 
attendance in the jurisdiction. If the sex offender has not 
previously been registered by another jurisdiction, the 
jurisdiction must carry out the initial registration procedure . . . 
when the sex offender appears. The jurisdiction must 
immediately forward the registration information to any other 
jurisdiction in which the sex offender is required to register 
under SORNA. If a jurisdiction is notified . . . that a sex offender 
is entering the United States and is expected to be locating in the 
jurisdiction, but the sex offender fails to appear and register as 
required, the jurisdiction must follow the procedures discussed 
in [Section XII of the Final Guidelines] for cases involving 
possible violation of registration requirements.90 
The key distinction between registration resulting from conviction in a 
foreign jurisdiction and conviction domestically is the shifting burden of 
who must register the offender. While in both cases the ultimate 
responsibility lies with the offender, for those with domestic convictions, 
                                                                                                                                      
 86. Id. at § VIII. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at § X, Registrants Based on Foreign Convictions. 
 89. Id. at IX. 
 90. Final Guidelines, supra note 27, § IX. 
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the registration is handled by the sentencing court.91 For those with foreign 
convictions, the burden is on the offender to present himself for registration 
upon entering the United States.92 This shifting burden is important 
because of the potential consequences a non-registering offender faces. 
In the case of an individual who was wrongly convicted in a foreign 
jurisdiction, or who was convicted without any due process or fundamental 
fairness, the individual is faced with a Morton’s Fork: either register for an 
offense, which he should not have been convicted of, thereby branding 
himself as a sex offender; or not register at all, and face both federal and 
state criminal charges.93 It is in this situation that the previously described 
lack of protections for due process become so critical. The only way for any 
judicial review of a foreign conviction would be if the individual failed to 
register, was arrested, and then asserted that the conviction should not 
require registration. There is no method for the individual to seek a pre-
registration judicial review. Such a review is unnecessary for domestic 
convictions because the offender will have had ample opportunity both in 
the trial phase, as well as at the appellate level, to challenge the conviction. 
Those same options are not available to an individual who was denied any 
semblance of due process in a foreign tribunal.94  
Furthermore, as noted above in Part III.A., it is doubtful that judicial 
review would even be effective. States are free to forego any inquiry at all 
into the fundamental fairness of foreign tribunal proceedings, and are free 
to require registration regardless of the lack of any due process protections. 
Even if a judge were to choose to review a registration requirement, it is 
unclear whether the judge would be able to provide any relief. This is 
illustrated clearly in McCarty v. Roos,95 a Nevada case dealing with a sex 
conviction from Japan. 
                                                                                                                                      
 91. Id. at § IX. 
 92. Id. at § IX (“Registrants Based on Foreign Convictions. 
 93. SMART, Sex Offender Registration and Failure to Register FAQs, OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS, http://ojp.gov/smart/faqs/faq_registration.htm#12 (last visited Nov. 12, 2016).  
If a sex offender convicted or adjudicated delinquent in a jurisdiction’s court is 
required to register under SORNA, and knowingly fails to register or update a 
registration as required, and the sex offender engages in interstate or 
international travel or enter or leaves or resides in Indian country, then the 
offender can be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §2250, the federal failure-to-
register offense. 
Id. 
 94. Thankfully, there is an easily effected solution to this problem which will be 
discussed infra in Part IV.  
 95. McCarty v. Roos, 998 F. Supp. 2d 950 (D. Nev. 2014). 
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3.  McCarty v. Roos 
In 2003, U.S. citizen Robert McCarty was convicted of “Quasi Indecent 
Assault” in Japan.96 The Japanese court found that McCarty was guilty of 
“inappropriately touch[ing] three underage students on a number of 
occasions.”97 At some point later, McCarty returned to the United States 
where he was forced to register as a sex offender under SORNA.98 McCarty 
sued for injunctive relief, “including (1) a declaration that he was denied 
due process and thus cannot be made to register as a sex offender; (2) 
expungement of federal and state files relating to his designation as a sex 
offender; and (3) a full name and identity change.”99 He further sought 
damages of $650,000.100 McCarty claimed he was entitled to this relief 
because “the Japanese conviction was obtained in a judicial system that is 
deficient of constitutional safeguards, including substantive and procedural 
due process.”101  
The district court correctly noted that McCarty was convicted in a Class 
2 jurisdiction,102 and that the State Department found that Japan “generally 
respected in practice the constitutional provisions for the right to a speedy 
and public trial by an impartial tribunal in all criminal cases.”103 In all the 
various decisions issued by the court, the same result was found—McCarty 
had not suffered any wrong—and, therefore, no judicial remedy was 
available to him.104 The same court analyzed, among other claims, 
McCarty’s claims that SORNA’s foreign conviction provision is 
unconstitutionally vague, and that it violates procedural due process 
rights.105 
                                                                                                                                      
 96. McCarty v. Roos, No. 2:11-CV-1538 JCM (RJJ), 2012 WL 6138313 *1 (D. Nev. Dec. 
7, 2012). Westlaw reveals a total of twelve separate court opinions, each with separate 
Westlaw references, which make up of the totality of litigation between McCarty and Roos. 
Unfortunately, no one case provides the entire factual background. When possible, citations 
will be made to the case found at 998 F. Supp. 2d 950 as that is the only published decision.    
 97. McCarty v. Roos, No. 2:11-CV-1538 JCM (NJK), 2014 WL 4829013 *3 (D. Nev. 
Sept. 30, 2014).  
 98. McCarty, 2012 WL 6138313 at *1. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at *2. For a description of Class 2 Jurisdictions, see supra Part III.A.2. 
 103. McCarty, 2012 WL 6138313 at *3. 
 104. See id.; see also McCarty v. Roos, 998 F. Supp. 2d 950, 957 (D. Nev. 2014). 
 105. McCarty, 2012 WL 6138313 at *4. 
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a. Unconstitutional Vagueness 
The court noted that a two-part test is used to determine if a statute is 
void for vagueness: first, the court will “determine whether the statute gives 
the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what 
is prohibited;” second, the court must consider “whether the law provides 
explicit standards for those who apply it.”106 The court determined that 
SORNA, and the accompanying guidelines, satisfy the first test.107 
Specifically, the court noted that “a person of ordinary intelligence [has] 
express notice that to be considered a sex offense requiring registration 
under SORNA, a foreign conviction must meet standards for fairness and 
due process that are established by specific guidelines.”108  
This determination was in error. While it is true that SORNA does 
require that a foreign conviction meet standards for fairness and due 
process, the guidelines that set out those standards are themselves vague.109 
Unfortunately, while the court properly looked to whether there were 
guidelines in place, its analysis stopped too soon.  
The court ignored the fact that, while the statute references guidelines 
and regulations, it did not look into the regulations themselves. It is unjust 
to find a statute contains the requisite specificity because it refers to 
guidelines and regulations, when those clarifying regulations themselves do 
not provide the requisite specificity. The purpose of requiring specificity in 
a statute is to “give[] the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited.”110 Yet, a person of even 
extraordinary intelligence cannot have a reasonable opportunity to know 
what is prohibited or required if a state is free to arbitrarily select any 
standard of fairness and due process it so desires. 
The court also found that SORNA passed the second prong of the 
vagueness test, stating “[t]he standards outlined in the SORNA Guidelines 
explicitly state how courts should treat foreign convictions depending on 
                                                                                                                                      
 106. Id. (quoting Pest Comm. v. Miller, 626 F.3d 1097, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
 109. This vagueness is discussed in detail supra in Part III.A. Essentially, while the Final 
Guidelines establish a list of jurisdictions from which convictions are always deemed to have 
met standards of fairness and due process, nowhere do the guidelines establish what actually 
constitutes that fairness and due process. Additionally, if a registering state so chooses, it 
may treat every conviction as having been obtained with fairness and due process, without 
any investigation whatsoever.  
 110. McCarty, 2012 WL 6138313 at *4. 
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the country of origination.”111 The court here was correct, albeit for an 
unjust reason. Courts are explicitly told how to treat foreign convictions; 
they are told to register all offenders from certain countries, regardless of 
whether those countries actually impose safeguards for fairness and due 
process generally, and regardless of whether those safeguards were present 
in any particular case.112 
b. Procedural due process 
The court next turned to a procedural due process analysis of SORNA’s 
application to McCarty.113 It did so by applying the Ninth Circuit’s two-step 
inquiry when evaluating procedural due process, which “first asks whether 
there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by 
the State; [and second,] examines whether the procedures attendant upon 
that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.”114 The court first refused 
to acknowledge that McCarty had any sort of liberty interest in not being 
forced to register as a sex offender, thereby rendering any procedural due 
process claim moot.115  Then, the court continued its analysis to say that 
even if there was a protected liberty interest, it was not violated.116  
The court rested its conclusion on Ninth Circuit precedent which stated 
that “because SORNA’s registration requirements ‘turn on an offender’s 
conviction alone—a fact that a convicted offender has already had a 
procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest—no additional process is 
required for due process.’”117 There are two issues with the court’s reliance 
on Juvenile Male in this case. First, the Ninth Circuit expressly depended on 
the offender having had an opportunity to contest his conviction in a 
procedurally safeguarded hearing.118 However, McCarty alleged that he was 
deprived of due process in his conviction, even alleging that his conviction 
                                                                                                                                      
 111. Id. 
 112. Of course, as discussed in Part III.A, supra, there is a semblance of a safeguard in 
that, by definition, Category 2 Jurisdictions must have been found by the U.S. Department of 
State to have generally provided safeguards for fairness and due process. Part III.A.2, supra, 
explains why that nominal protection is inadequate.  
 113. McCarty, 2012 WL 6138313 at *5. 
 114. Id. (quoting United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1013 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
 115. Id. (relying on a Supreme Court of the United States decision which held that sex 
offenders do not have a liberty interest in being free from adverse publicity or reputational 
harm); see also Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003). 
 116. McCarty, 2012 WL 6138313 at *5. 
 117. Id. (quoting United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
 118. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1014.  
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was “obtained as a result of ‘undisputed Japanese torture.’”119 While the 
court was not obligated to believe McCarty’s allegation, general principles 
of fairness and due process would dictate that the court at least 
acknowledge such an allegation, even if to state that it finds it inadequate. 
The court did not do so in McCarty’s case.120 
The second issue with the court’s reliance on Juvenile Male is that the 
precedent itself is flawed. The court in Juvenile Male asserted that a 
convicted offender has had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to 
contest his potential conviction. Yet, under SORNA’s foreign conviction 
registration requirements, that is incorrect because the standard for a Class 
2 Jurisdiction is that the State Department finds the jurisdiction generally 
upheld principles of fairness and due process.121 There is no requirement 
that the defendant actually received due process in an individual trial. By 
relying on Juvenile Male, the McCarty court approved the flawed circular 
logic that because the trial results in a conviction and a conviction is what 
triggers the registration requirement, due process is satisfied, even when no 
due process is received.  
The court next listed several deficiencies in the Japanese criminal process 
before summarily dismissing them with citations to the Japan Country 
Reports from the State Department.122 Those deficiencies include “the 
absence of a trial by jury, issues relating to obtaining qualified interpreters 
for foreign defendants, and issues relating to defendants’ access to police 
records and other evidence.”123 The court noted that the State Department 
acknowledged these deficiencies, but ultimately found Japan “generally 
respected in practice the constitutional provisions for the right to a speedy 
and public trial by an impartial tribunal in all criminal cases.”124 The State 
Department reports also found that “a criminal defendant in Japan was 
presumed innocent, assured a public trial by an independent civilian court 
with defense counsel, had the right to cross-examination . . . [and] had 
access to private counsel.”125 Relying on the fact that McCarty did not point 
to any authority that would show the reports are inaccurate, the court found 
                                                                                                                                      
 119. McCarty v. Roos, No. 2:11-CV-1538 JCM (NJK), 2014 WL 4829013, *3 (2014).  
 120. The court does, however, reference McCarty’s allegation that his trial was not fair 
two paragraphs later but it does so only to say that even if McCarty’s allegations were true, he 
was still not entitled to additional process. Referring to the allegations in that context does 
not provide a justification for the court’s reliance on Juvenile Male.  
 121. Final Guidelines, supra note 27, § IV(B).  
 122. McCarty, 2012 WL 6138313 at *5-6.  
 123. Id. at *5.  
 124. Id. (referencing the 2002 and 2003 Japan Country Reports). 
 125. Id. at *6.  
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that there was nothing to indicate “that the process provided by SORNA is 
inadequate.”126 
What the court failed to recognize is that the mere availability of those 
rights does not guarantee due process, if the rights cannot effectively be 
used. For example, the court noted approvingly that the accused in Japan 
was entitled to private defense counsel. However, that defense counsel 
cannot be considered effective when a foreign accused cannot obtain a 
qualified interpreter. The accused is also entitled to cross-examine opposing 
witnesses, but cannot do so properly without full access to police records 
and other evidence. These competing realities highlight two issues. First, it 
highlights why a finding that a country generally guarantees fairness and 
due process can result in a complete lack of due process for the individual. 
Second, it shows why it is so vital that courts be empowered to 
independently evaluate whether due process was actually afforded on an 
individual level.   
McCarty is but one example of the harmful potential of SORNA. While 
the lack of guaranteed due process is problematic in and of itself, it becomes 
more so in light of the Sex Offender Management Assessment and Planning 
Initiative (“SOMAPI”) report. SOMAPI is a report filed by the SMART 
office which reports on the methods and efficacy of SORNA.127 The report 
found that 
[s]ome studies find lower rates of sex crimes following SORN 
implementation, while others do not. Studies based on a 
comparison of outcomes for sex offenders subject and not 
subject to SORN also produced mixed findings. An arguable lack 
of sufficient scientific rigor may further cloud the import of 
studies in this area. Therefore, the results of SORN research 
undertaken to date continue to leave open questions about the 
                                                                                                                                      
 126. Id. As of Sept. 30, 2016, McCarty still has not been able to attain judicial relief, or 
even review, of the actual presence of due process in his trial. His counsel filed an appeal on 
Oct. 7, 2014 with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which has not yet been heard. McCarty 
v. Roos, No. 14-16934 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014).  
 127. OFFICE OF SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING, MONITORING, APPREHENDING, REGISTERING, & 
TRACKING, SEX OFFENDER MGMT. ASSESSMENT & PLAN. INITIATIVE (2014). Due to the federal 
government’s proclivity for distilling all of its actions into a veritable alphabet soup of 
agencies and acts, a brief review of the above-mentioned agencies follows. The SMART office 
is the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and 
Tracking, and, in addition to filing the SOMAPI report, it is responsible for promulgating 
the Final Guidelines used to implement SORNA, the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act.  
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effects of registration and community notification 
requirements.128 
This report highlights two key problems with the current treatment of 
foreign sex offenders. First, by SMART’s own admission, it is unclear 
whether the registration of sex offenders in general has any positive effect 
on society. Second, there has been insufficient research regarding whether 
the goals of SORNA are actually being realized through the methods 
implemented by the Final Guidelines. What SMART has put into place 
through the Final Guidelines is a system of uncertain efficacy that allows for 
the denial of due process rights of United States citizens without allowing 
them a means of judicial redressability. While it is a basic principal of 
Constitutional law that fundamental rights such as due process may be 
infringed upon by the State for matters of great necessity, the infringement 
here cannot be justified when the State itself admits it is unsure whether 
there is any value to its actions. 
C. Foreign Convictions and Federal Rule of Evidence 609 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 allows for the impeachment of witnesses 
through the admission of evidence of foreign convictions. While the rule 
itself is one which has been derided and subject to impassioned calls for its 
recession,129 this Section will focus on the potential for abuse of the rule 
which is made possible by the Final Guidelines.  
FRE 609 was enacted by Congress amidst much debate.130 In the House 
of Representatives, the debate focused on two competing concerns: a desire 
for fairness for both the prosecution and the defense. In fact, the record of 
the debate occupies more pages in the Congressional Record than that 
occupied by the rest of the Federal Rules of Evidence combined.131 The 
concerns for the defendant are particularly relevant, due to the extremely 
prejudicial nature of any prior conviction, let alone one for a sex offense. As 
Senator Ted Kennedy stated, 
Mr. President, all authorities agree that the greatest source of 
prejudice to a defendant is a prior felony conviction. Thus, many 
                                                                                                                                      
 128. Id. at 161.  
 129. See, e.g., Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A 
look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Evidence Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 1 
(1999).  
 130. Id. at 7.  
 131. Victor Gold, Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the 
Politics of Rule 609, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2302–03 (1994).  
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innocent defendants will not take the stand to testify in their own 
defense, if a prior felony conviction can be used against them. 
Jurors may conclude that the defendant is guilty because he has 
not taken the stand. On the other hand, if the defendant does 
testify, the jury may base its verdict on his prior conviction, 
rather than solely the evidence before it.132 
As Senator Kennedy noted, under FRE 609, a defendant with a previous 
felony conviction is faced with two unappealing options. The defendant 
may take the stand in his own defense (a right that all defendants possess), 
and as a result allow the prosecution to introduce evidence of his prior 
conviction, which could color the jury’s opinion of the defendant. 
Alternatively, the defendant could refuse to take the stand, which again can 
negatively color the jury’s opinion under a belief that any innocent person 
would choose to testify on his own behalf. Herein lies the problem for a 
defendant forced to register under SORNA because of a foreign conviction.  
The issue here can best be illustrated through a hypothetical. Assume 
John is a man who is currently the defendant in a sexual assault case. Three 
years prior, John was convicted of felony rape in a Category 2 jurisdiction. 
In fact, John committed no rape. However, John did not receive anything 
resembling due process in the foreign court. He was denied access to an 
attorney, could not present evidence in his favor, and was summarily 
sentenced by the judge after only a five-minute argument presented by the 
prosecutor. By any measure, he was denied all due process and fundamental 
fairness.133 After his two-year incarceration, he returned to the United States 
where he was forced to register as a sex offender under SORNA.134 
                                                                                                                                      
 132. Id. at 2305 n.57 (citing 120 Cong. Rec. 37,080 (1974)).  
 133. As described supra in Part III.A.2, a Category 2 jurisdiction must only have generally 
enforced the right to a fair trial, as determined by the United States Department of State. In 
fact, several countries, such as Colombia, were found to have generally enforced the right to 
a fair trial even while the State Department noted several significant and troubling deviations 
from both due process and fundamental fairness. The situation presented in this 
hypothetical is entirely plausible in Colombia according to the State Department’s findings.  
 134. This is assuming John would actually comply with the law and register. It is entirely 
plausible that John would have no reason to suspect he is required to register as he was 
innocent of the crime for which he was unjustly convicted. Additionally, unless the foreign 
state has an agreement with the United States which provides that the foreign state will 
report any convictions of United States citizens to the United States, John may decide that it 
is better to not register and report his conviction to avoid the consequences of being placed 
on the registry. John must therefore choose between registering himself as a sex offender for 
a crime he did not commit, or risk the consequences of his non-registration if his conviction 
were somehow discovered.  
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During the current trial, John is faced with a difficult decision. He knows 
that if he can testify on his own behalf, he can show that he is completely 
innocent of the current sexual assault charge. Or, he can refuse to testify on 
his own behalf and risk the jury believing that only a guilty man does not 
defend himself. However, the prosecutor knows that John is a registered sex 
offender. If John were to take the stand, the prosecutor could seek to admit 
John’s status as a sex offender as evidence of his foreign conviction.135 
Under FRE 609, this evidence must be admitted. It is a crime that was 
punishable in the convicting jurisdiction by imprisonment for more than 
one year,136 and it is highly probative since John is currently on trial for the 
same offense.137 Additionally, the conviction was within the last ten years,138 
there was no pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation,139 and it 
was not a juvenile adjudication.140  
Of course, the evidence of the conviction could only be admitted under 
the guise of discrediting John’s testimony, but the common inherent 
disdain of sex offenders would almost certainly color the juror’s opinion of 
John, as well as the evidence presented against him.141 Assuming John is 
innocent of the current rape charge as well, it is entirely possible that John 
could be convicted based solely on a jury’s predilection to believe a sex 
offender will commit additional sex offenses.142 
                                                                                                                                      
 135. The argument would likely flow as follows: only those convicted of sex offenses must 
register under SORNA, John is a registered sex offender; therefore, John has been convicted 
of a sex offense.  
 136. FED R. EVID.  609(a)(1).  
 137. FED R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B). 
 138. FED R. EVID. 609(b). Arguably the evidence would be admissible under FED R. EVID 
609(b) even if the conviction had been from longer than ten years ago due to the similarity of 
the offenses. 
 139. FED R. EVID.  609(c). 
 140. FED R. EVID.  609(d). 
 141. For an excellent argument in favor of never allowing previous sex crime convictions 
as impeachment evidence due to the overwhelmingly prejudicial nature which always 
surpasses any probative value of the convictions, see Julia T. Rickert, Comment, Denying 
Defendants the Benefit of a Reasonable Doubt: Federal Rule of Evidence 609 and Past Sex 
Crime Convictions, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 213, 217 (2010),  
 142. Notwithstanding John’s innocence here, a predilection to believe that sex offenders 
will offend again is reasonably well founded, as “[r]esearch has demonstrated that repeat 
offenders account for a disproportionate amount of crime and that offenders released from 
prison are arrested at rates 30 to 45 times higher than the general population.” OFFICE OF SEX 
OFFENDER SENTENCING, MONITORING, APPREHENDING, REGISTERING, & TRACKING, SEX 
OFFENDER MGMT. ASSESSMENT & PLAN. INITIATIVE (2014) (internal citation omitted) (noting 
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The end result for John is that he is injured multiple times. First, he is the 
victim of a corrupt foreign judicial system which, in a sham trial, convicted 
him of a crime of which he is innocent. Then, the laws of his country, 
SORNA and the Final Guidelines, injure him by forcing him to register as a 
sex offender, under penalty of imprisonment, for a crime he never 
committed, without allowing him any judicial redressability to challenge the 
unjust conviction. Finally, he is forced to choose between participating in 
his own defense or accepting the stigmas and prejudices that are associated 
with being a registered sex offender. This is the reality for an individual who 
is in John’s shoes.  
IV. LOOKING TO THE UCCJEA AS A WAY FORWARD 
It is clear that the current system under SORNA cannot be allowed to 
continue. However, rather than scrapping the current treatment of foreign 
convictions entirely, an easily applied alternative may be derived from the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”),143 
and its application by a Washington State court in In Re Marriage of 
Donboli.144 
A. In Re Marriage of Donboli 
In Donboli, the Washington Court of Appeals had to decide whether to 
enforce a child custody determination given by an Iranian Court.145 Bita 
Donboli (“Wife”) filed suit for the divorce of her husband, Nader Donboli 
(“Husband”) in Washington.146 Both Husband and Wife were dual citizens 
of the United States and Iran.147 After the birth of their son, Wife travelled 
to Iran to receive help raising the child from her mother, and Husband later 
joined her in Iran.148 Upon Husband’s arrival in Iran, he violently beat Wife 
to the point that she required hospitalization for two weeks and subsequent 
                                                                                                                                      
that true sex offense recidivism rates for sex offenders are likely higher than reported due to 
the high number of unreported sex offenses which occur). 
 143. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENF’T ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS 
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1997). 
 144. In re Marriage of Donboli, 128 Wash. App. 1039 (2005) (case internally paginated 
beginning at *1).   
 145. Id. at *1.  
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at *2.  
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physical therapy.149 After a great deal of trouble circumventing Husband’s 
attempts to stop her, Wife was able to return to the United States.150 
The case contains a voluminous timeline of events, as both parties filed 
for divorce, Husband in Iran, and Wife in Washington.151 What is most 
relevant for this discussion is the treatment of the child custody award given 
by the Iranian court, which was entered before the Washington court gave a 
child custody award.152 The Iranian court had entered an award granting 
full custody of the child to Husband.153 Under the UCCJEA, which 
Washington has adopted, “a child-custody determination made in a foreign 
country under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the 
jurisdictional standards of [the UCCJEA] must be recognized and 
enforced.”154 Unless the court could find some justification not to, it would 
have to grant comity to the Iranian custody award. 
After looking to both its own precedent and conflict of laws principles, 
the court decided that the UCCJEA only required enforcement of foreign 
custody awards that utilized similar substantive law to Washington.155 
Washington utilized the best interest of the child standard, while Iran 
automatically awards custody of all children over the age of two to the 
father.156 The court held that because the Iranian procedures did not 
comport with Washington’s strong public policy and substantive law, the 
Iranian custody award would not be given any effect and the court could 
enter its own award in favor of Wife.157 
                                                                                                                                      
 149. Donboli, 128 Wash. App. at *2-3 
 150. Id. at *2.  
 151. Id. at *3-5. 
 152. Id. at *4. 
 153. Id. 
 154. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENF’T ACT § 105 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1997). 
 155. Donboli, 128 Wash. App. at *15-16. The court did not say that it could not, or would 
not, ever enforce a foreign custody award derived from laws not substantially similar to the 
State of Washington’s law. Instead, the court only recognized that it was not required to 
enforce such foreign custody awards. Id. 
 156. Id. at *16. 
 157. Id. at *21. 
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B. Applying Donboli to SORNA 
The basic similarity between the UCCJEA and the foreign convictions 
provision of SORNA is that they both codify a grant of comity158 to the 
judgments of foreign states. The distinction is whether or not that comity is 
required or preferred. Where SORNA requires that comity be granted to 
the foreign conviction, the UCCJEA recognizes that foreign judgments and 
orders must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The UCCJEA also has the 
advantage of being in-line with Supreme Court precedent. 
‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute 
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, 
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows 
within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of 
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and 
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other 
persons who are under the protection of its laws.159 
One positive of SORNA is that the flaw discussed here is easily fixable, 
and would not require Congressional action. Rather, the SMART office 
need only alter its Final Guidelines. This could be done in several ways. 
First, at a minimum, a provision entitling those who would be forced to 
register due to a foreign sex conviction to petition a court in the registering 
jurisdiction. This is the approach Michigan courts have taken for 
considering foreign convictions for impeachment purposes.160 In Wallach, 
the Michigan Court of Appeals chose to allow the introduction of foreign 
convictions on a case-by-case basis, subject to a judicial review of the 
procedural safeguards in place to determine if the foreign procedure 
provided fundamental fairness.161 
Notably, a Michigan court earlier held that it constitutes manifest 
unfairness to enhance a defendant’s sentence on the basis of his foreign 
conviction.162 The foreign conviction occurred in Canada, and the appellate 
court concluded that “[s]ince many foreign jurisdictions do not provide due 
process rights equivalent to those existing in the United States, it would be 
                                                                                                                                      
 158. Comity is defined as “[a] practice among political entities (as countries, states, or 
courts of different jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual recognition of legislative, executive, 
and judicial acts.” Comity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 159. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).  
 160. People v. Wallach, 312 N.W.2d 387 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 
331 N.W.2d 730 (Mich. 1983).  
 161. Id. at 403.  
 162. People v. Braithwaite, 240 N.W.2d 293, 294 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (per curiam). 
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manifestly unfair to allow foreign convictions to [be] considered in 
sentencing a defendant convicted of a crime in this country.”163 This raises 
the interesting question of what Michigan would do with an individual 
convicted of a sex crime felony in Canada, who would be forced to register 
as a sex offender upon moving to Michigan. Under SORNA, Canada is a 
Class 1 Jurisdiction.164 A conviction from a Class 1 jurisdiction requires the 
registration of the offender, without allowing an inquiry into whether any 
due process was actually provided on a case-by-case basis.165 Yet, under 
Michigan Court of Appeals precedent, foreign countries—including 
Canada—may not “provide due process rights equivalent to those existing 
in the United States, [and] it would be manifestly unfair to allow foreign 
convictions to be considered” for sentencing purposes. It seems illogical 
that it would suddenly become fair or just to allow those foreign convictions 
to be considered for registration purposes, especially if demonstrable 
evidence of violations of due process and fundamental fairness is available.  
Following the Michigan trend and allowing a foreign convicted sex 
offender to challenge the requirement of his registration preserves the 
constitutional rights of the would-be registrant. However, an easily 
foreseeable criticism of this case-by-case review is that such a review would 
dramatically increase the workload of an already overburdened court 
system. But, if there is an issue with overburdened courts, the answer 
cannot be to erode fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Rather, the solution would be to streamline the legal process in a 
constitutional fashion, such as to create and fund more courts or to even 
reduce the number of crimes, thereby reducing the number of people 
involved in the judicial system.  
Any time the judgment of another country is to be applied by the United 
States against a United States citizen, due process demands a case-by-case 
review. As Melissa Kimes points out: 
Even if it were possible to point to foreign countries that 
theoretically provide the same protections that our system does, 
it is necessary to look beyond the printed word and into actual 
practice.166 In determining whether a foreign system provides fair 
trials to criminal defendants, it is necessary to look at the 
country’s entire criminal process—actual practice as well as law 
                                                                                                                                      
 163. Id. at 294. 
 164. Final Guidelines, supra note 27, § IV(B). 
 165. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 166. Kimes, supra note 48, at 521 (citing Rudolf B. Schlesinger et al., COMPARATIVE LAW 
880–90 (5th ed. 1988)). 
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in the books must be considered. Political realities in many 
countries affect the functioning of the judicial systems, and it is 
possible that, although constitutional and statutory law may 
seem to provide some semblance of due process rights, the actual 
practice is to the contrary.167  
Additionally:  
[a]lthough other countries have due process clauses in their 
constitutions and many countries provide criminal defendants 
with most of the same safeguards that the United States provides, 
no other system truly matches the rules that have been deemed 
necessary in the United States to protect both individual fairness 
and reliability of convictions, nor have such protections 
necessarily been interpreted to the same extent or in the same 
manner as they have been in the United States.168 
While general principles of comity do not require that every procedural 
safeguard be provided to defendants in foreign courts in order for them to 
be enforced in the United States, a minimum standard should be observed. 
What qualifies as minimum due process requirements has always been 
within the purview of the courts, and should remain so. By enacting the 
Final Guidelines—which do not allow for any judicial review of what 
constitutes due process, but instead shift that role to the United States 
Department of State,169—the SMART office has performed an end-run 
around judicial scrutiny of the regulatory scheme. Due process, 
fundamental fairness, and the Constitution demand more.  
The fix to the Final Guidelines is simple, and does not require a 
wholesale reworking of either SORNA or the Final Guidelines. It can be 
done as easily as having the SMART office add one simple provision to the 
Final Guidelines. Such a provision would allow anyone required to register 
as a sex offender under the foreign conviction provision of SORNA to have 
the opportunity to challenge its application. Additionally, in order to 
preserve the strong public policy in favor of registering sex offenders, the 
                                                                                                                                      
 167. Kimes, supra note 48, at 521-22 (citing Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 
293 F. Supp. 892, 906–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)) (refusing to enforce an East German decision 
regarding trademark rights after reviewing the administration of justice and the lack of 
judicial independence in that country and determining that the prior decision was lacking in 
objectivity and therefore unreliable).  
 168. Id. at 521 (internal citation omitted); see, e.g., Note, Constitutional Problems in the 
Execution of Foreign Penal Sentences: The Mexican-American Prisoner Transfer Treaty, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 1500, 1506-10 (1977). 
 169. Final Guidelines, supra note 27, § IV(B).  
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Guidelines could still allow for a presumption of fundamental fairness in 
foreign convictions, as well as maintain the tripartite class divisions.  
If the current jurisdictional classifications are retained, Class 1 
jurisdictions would impose the highest burden of proof upon the challenger 
to demonstrate a lack of due process and fundamental fairness, perhaps 
requiring a showing that the challenger was actually harmed by the 
procedural deficiencies. A Class 2 jurisdiction would require a less 
burdensome evidentiary requirement for the challenger, and a Class 3 
would require less than that. Ideally, a Class 3 jurisdiction conviction would 
shift the burden to the Federal government to show that the conviction was 
obtained in compliance with principles of fundamental fairness and due 
process.  
This shifting of the burden to the government is just, particularly in light 
of the fact that the United States Department of State has already 
determined that a Class 3 jurisdiction has not even generally upheld 
standards of due process and fundamental fairness within the past three 
years.170 The Guidelines also do not compel registration of those with Class 
3 jurisdiction sex offense convictions, instead leaving it up the state to 
register those convicts if they so choose.171 That registration can occur with 
or without an inquiry into the level of due process granted.172 
The other benefit to this proposed solution is that it is already envisioned 
within the Final Guidelines. When a conviction comes from a Class 3 
jurisdiction, the registering jurisdiction is 
not required to register the convicted person if the jurisdiction 
determines—through whatever process or procedure it may 
choose to adopt—that the conviction does not constitute a 
reliable indication of factual guilt because of the lack of an 
impartial tribunal, because of denial of the right to respond to 
the evidence against the person or to present exculpatory 
evidence, or because of denial of the right to the assistance of 
counsel.173 
The availability of review for Class 3 jurisdictions should be expanded to 
include all three Classes. Additionally, the language should be altered to 
read accordingly: the registering jurisdiction is “not required to register the 
convicted person if the jurisdiction determines—through whatever process 
                                                                                                                                      
 170. Final Guidelines, supra note 27, § IV(B). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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or procedure it may choose to adopt—[or upon a judicial determination 
upon the application of the convicted person,] that the conviction was not 
obtained through a means which guaranteed fundamental fairness and due 
process to the accused.” This preserves the intent of Congress in enacting 
SORNA, of the SMART office in enacting the Final Guidelines, and the 
Constitution in protecting due process rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act in 
order to promote the public welfare through the registration of sex 
offenders.174 Included in that registration scheme is a provision which 
requires those who were convicted of felony sex offenses in foreign 
jurisdictions to register. However, those forced to register as a result of a 
foreign sex offense have no relief if the foreign conviction was obtained 
without any semblance of due process or fundamental fairness. Not only do 
the Final Guidelines, which implement SORNA, fail to provide any manner 
of judicial review for convictions from certain jurisdictions, but the 
Guidelines also actively prohibit a registering jurisdiction from undertaking 
such a review. In light of the serious consequences, both socially and legally, 
for an individual who has the status of registered sex offender, the 
availability of some form of review of those convictions is demanded by the 
Constitution. 
The clear and easy solution to this denial of due process is to amend the 
Final Guidelines. Such an amendment would be simple, and it would be in 
line with what is already contemplated by the Guidelines. By allowing a 
would-be-registrant to challenge the registration requirement as applied to 
him, on the grounds that the conviction was obtained without due process 
or fundamental fairness, both the individual’s and the government’s 
interests can be satisfied. Such a provision could be added to the Final 
Guidelines by the SMART Office under its authority to promulgate 
regulations to implement SORNA. Requiring that a foreign conviction 
satisfy a minimum standard of fundamental fairness on a case-by-case basis 
is a requirement that should be appealing to all, including both the 
convicted individual and the government which is sworn to uphold 
Constitutional rights and protections. 
                                                                                                                                      
 174. This goal of protecting the public from sex offenders is a laudable one—one which 
all governments should pursue wholeheartedly. The critique presented in this Note is not 
directed at the goal of protecting the public, nor at SORNA as a whole. The criticism is 
directed solely at the overly-broad guidelines which can have a life-altering negative impact 
on any innocents who have been wrongly convicted.  
 
